It is now widely recognized that information technology (IT) was critical to the dramatic acceleration of U.S. labor productivity growth in the mid-1990s. This paper traces the evolution of productivity estimates to document how and when this perception emerged. Early studies concluded that IT was relatively unimportant. It was only after the massive IT investment boom of the late 1990s that this investment and underlying productivity increases in the IT-producing sectors were identified as important sources of growth. Although IT has diminished in significance since the dot-com crash of 2000, we project that private sector productivity growth will average around 2.5 percent per year for the next decade, a pace that is only moderately below the average for the 1995-2005 period.
wrote: "Something is out of kilter here. Either the technology isn't all it's cracked up to be, or we haven't yet seen the impact of the new technology on the economy (pg. 173)." While acknowledging considerable uncertainty, Krugman dismissed the delay hypothesis and concluded "my own view is much more pessimistic…and I worry that productivity growth may actually decline (pg. 174)." Martin Baily and Robert Gordon (1988) provided an early discussion of slow measured productivity growth in the presence of massive technical progress. They concluded that increasing measurement error explained only a small portion of the productivity slowdown, implying that the disconnect was real. In contrast, Carol Corrado and Larry Slifman (1996) subsequently presented a decomposition of productivity growth that showed the slowest productivity growth in the nonfarm noncorporate sector, where output was most difficult to measure, and raised the possibility that measurement error was seriously distorting the productivity statistics. From a neoclassical perspective, however, the small contribution was not surprising. As pointed out by Oliner and Sichel (1994) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995) , computers accounted for a very small share of the capital stock in the 1980s and early 1990s and the growth contribution was correspondingly small.
With the benefit of hindsight and substantially revised data, we now know that the IT optimists were right and that the U.S. productivity picture improved sharply in the mid-1990s. In 1997, BLS revised annual productivity growth for 1996 substantially upward and strong productivity growth followed throughout the late 1990s. By early 2001, BLS (2001) estimated NFB productivity growth for the trailing five years as a remarkable 2.8 percent and the "productivity resurgence" took center stage in policy discussions. While acknowledging the uncertainty and difficulty in projecting productivity growth, CBO (2001) featured NFB productivity growth on the cover of its January Budget and Economic Outlook and raised its projections of GDP growth to 3.3 percent and NFB labor productivity growth to 2.7 percent for the next decade. This point is worth emphasizing; in just four years, CBO more than doubled its ten-year projection of NFB productivity growth from 1.2 to 2.7 percent! 5
The dramatic improvement in productivity growth in the late 1990s did not go unnoticed by monetary and fiscal policymakers. The rapid price declines in IT assets, for example, acted as a "positive supply shock," the mirror image of the negative oil price shocks in 1970s. On the real side, the growth of IT contributed to the stunning increase in estimates of potential growth for the U.S. economy. This combination of lower inflation and rapid economic growth allowed monetary policymakers to be more accommodating and to pursue a policy of "opportunistic disinflation." 6 Similarly, stronger productivity and output growth contributed to short-lived fiscal surpluses and more sanguine budget outlooks. In January 1997, CBO projected that the annual federal budget deficit would increase to $278 billion by fiscal year 2007 (CBO, 1997) . By January 2001, this had reversed to a projected annual fiscal surplus of $573 billion in and $796 billion in 2010 (CBO, 2001 . While this improvement in the budget outlook cannot be attributed entirely to enhanced productivity growth, much of it can. CBO (2001) concluded that "if productivity growth over the next ten years is slower than its previous trend, thus reversing the gains since 1996, the budget outlook will be substantially worse than even in the pessimistic scenario (pg. 101)." In a study of the evolving CBO budget outlook, Walsh (1999) estimated that a 1% decline in economic growth projections in a five-year period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) would reduce the cumulative surplus by about one-quarter.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the current productivity outlook with the evolving perspective over the past decade. By examining the historical record on a real-time basis and reviewing the contemporaneous interpretation and analysis, we are able to uncover the sources and implications of the U.S. productivity resurgence. In particular, we describe the abrupt shift in the perceived importance of information technology (IT). Within the span of the decade, the focus of productivity analysts switched from a "computer productivity paradox" to the near-universal belief in an IT-led "productivity resurgence." This dramatic reversal reflected significant changes in the real economy, such as the accelerating price declines in IT-related equipment in the late 1990s and massive investments in IT as firms responded. Methodological changes, such as the reclassification of software as an investment good by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in 1999, also contributed to the growing recognition of the critical role of IT in the acceleration of U.S. productivity.
We begin by examining real-time, vintage estimates from the BLS and CBO to track the evolving productivity picture. We also review contemporaneous academic and government research that quantified the role of IT as a source of economic growth to document the dramatic change in the perception of IT. 7 We use the most recent data to update our earlier work and demonstrate the continued strength of U.S. productivity growth and the changing role of IT.
Finally, we turn to the future and present new projections of potential U.S. productivity growth over the next decade, excluding cyclical influences.
Our analysis shows that while U.S. productivity growth has remained very robust through 2005, the sources have changed. We document that the role of IT declined in relative importance after the dot-com crash of 2000. Investment in IT equipment and software and rates of productivity growth in the IT-producing sectors have receded considerably from the phenomenal levels of the late 1990s. We emphasize, however, that contributions of IT to productivity growth remain very large in relation to the size of IT in the U.S. economy.
The outlook for potential productivity growth remains optimistic with a base-case estimate for the next decade of 2.5 percent per year. This is very rapid from a historical perspective and only moderately below recent experience. Somewhat slower productivity growth reflects a natural evolution of the U.S. economy toward a more sustainable growth path as the widely anticipated demographic trends unfold. Our estimates are close to the most recent estimates of CBO (2007) and Council of Economic Advisors (CEA, 2007), but substantially above those presented by Gordon (2006) and the Social Security Administration (2006). We conclude that there is little evidence that the U.S. economy will revert to the low rates of productivity growth seen during the slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s.
II. The Evolving Productivity Picture
We begin with a retrospective look at U.S. productivity growth, asking what productivity analysts, macroeconomists, and policy makers knew, or thought they knew, about productivity trends at different points of time during the last decade. As a starting point, it is clear that the post-1995 productivity surge took virtually all observers by surprise as economic growth continually surpassed expectations. We examine this historical record not to criticize specific views, but to obtain a better understanding of how the evolving productivity picture was perceived in real time.
We first report the most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) productivity data for the nonfarm business (NFB) sector ending in 2006:Q4 from BLS (2007). Figure 1 plots both fourquarter moving averages and mean growth rates for three eras -1948:Q4-1973:Q4, 1973:Q4-1995:Q4, and 1995:Q4-2006:Q4. 8 As is well-known, productivity growth slowed during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, and then increased substantially in the mid-1990s. Productivity data, however, are frequently and substantially revised, so we turn next to the real-time productivity data.
a) The Official Statistics Our first step is to examine the "headline" productivity estimates produced by the BLS.
Different vintages of productivity data are required in order to provide a real-time assessment of productivity trends. The February release of each year reports the annual growth rates for the past 10 years for the major sectors --private business, nonfarm private business (NFB), and manufacturing. For example, the February 1994 release shows productivity growth rates from 1984 to 1993. Each subsequent release adds a more recent year, drops the earliest year, and incorporates revisions to the underlying data and methods in the intervening releases.
Figure 2 plots productivity growth for 10-year periods using this real-time data from different vintages. The post-1995 increase is very striking. Using data through 1996, for example, the February 1997 BLS press release reported that the average productivity growth rate for the trailing 10 years was only 0.70 percent (BLS, 1997) . By February 2001 the trailing 10-year growth rate had risen to 2.2 percent as the strong productivity growth of the late 1990s
replaced the weak growth rates of the late 1980s (BLS, 2001) . The real-time data show further acceleration in the early 2000s, but the most recent productivity releases show some deceleration. We discuss the impact of this below.
It is also clear that the productivity data are subject large and frequent revisions. The initial estimate of productivity growth for 1996, released in early 1997, was only 0.8 percent for the NFB sector with no indication of resurgence (BLS, 1997) . Over the subsequent year, however, incorporation of new data from the 1996 Hours at Work Survey led to a sharp downward revision of 0.6 percent in hours growth and an upward revision in NFB output growth for 1996 resulted in a surge in measured productivity growth to 1.9 percent (BLS, 1998) . After further revisions in source data and methodology, the latest data indicate that productivity growth for 1996 was an even stronger 2.7 percent (BLS, 2007) . To summarize the magnitude of these revisions, consider that the standard deviation of the first 10 estimates of 1996 productivity growth was 0.58, a wide range that is typical of other years as well. In recent years, the sign of the revisions has switched as productivity growth has typically been revised downward.
Substantial revisions obviously complicate the task of monitoring and analyzing productivity trends in real time.
Another perspective on productivity growth is provided by tracking projections of future trends over time. 9 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly produces projections of real GDP growth and NFB productivity growth, so that changes in these projections can be followed over time. Like the projections we report below, the CBO projections are for potential growth of productivity, controlling for cyclical fluctuations, so these projections embody CBO's views about the strength of the underlying trends. Figure 3 plots the real-time projections of potential output growth and NFB productivity growth from CBO, when available, from The Budget and Economic Outlook, typically released in January of each year. 10 The projections are usually for 10 years into the future, the "budget window" used in analyzing the fiscal outlook.
Figure 3 also presents average growth for the trailing 10-year period from BLS for the NFB sector from the same period, typically released in February of the same year.
As in Figures 1 and 2 , the acceleration of productivity growth is readily apparent from the rolling BLS data. The CBO projections show a commensurate increase. In January 1997, for example, the CBO 10-year projection of NFB productivity was only 1.15 percent (CBO, 1997).
By January 2001, just four years later, this projection had more than doubled to 2.7 percent (CBO, 2001 , 1997, 2001, 2006a, 2007) .
b) Interpretation
We next turn to the interpretation of the productivity data by examining the sources of productivity growth with specific attention on the role of IT. While many economists have examined these data with a variety of methods, we focus on studies by the BLS (1983, 1993, 2000) , Gordon (1998 Gordon ( , 2000 Gordon ( , 2004 Gordon ( , 2006 , Stiroh (1995, 2000) , Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002 , 2004 , and Oliner and Sichel (1994 , 2000 , 2002 because these studies are based on relatively similar methodologies and allow comparisons over time. 12 In addition, we do not review the large literature on the link between IT and productivity growth in other economies (summarized, for example, by van Ark and Inklaar (2005)), industry studies such as Baily and
Lawrence (2001), Triplett and Bosworth (2004, 2006) , or Stiroh (2002) , or the microeconomic literatures reviwed by Brynjolffson and Hitt (2000, 2003) . Focusing on the aggregate, we first summarize the standard growth accounting techniques and then describe how the results evolved and new interpretations emerged.
The starting point is the production possibility frontier that describes efficient combinations of outputs and inputs for the economy as a whole. Aggregate output Y consists of outputs of investment goods and consumption goods. These are produced from aggregate inputs of capital services K and labor services L. Total factor productivity A is a "Hicks-neutral" augmentation of aggregate input, so the production possibility frontier takes the form:
The standard framework can be extended in two ways to highlight IT. First, economywide TFP growth can be allocated between gains in the IT-producing sectors and gains in the rest of the economy. Second, capital services can be decomposed into the use of IT capital - 10 The CBO outlook has been released in January and updated in August since 2001. Prior to that time the updates were published on a similar, but less systematic schedule. 11 See CBO (2005) for details. 12 Other notable studies of this type include Haimowitz (1998) and Whelan (2002). computer hardware, software, and telecommunications equipment -and the use of non-IT capital as:
where A IT is TFP in IT production, A n is TFP in non-IT production, K IT are capital services from IT assets, and K n are capital services from non-IT assets.
Under the assumption that product and factor markets are competitive, the extended framework in (2) implies the following decomposition:
where each v represents the input share of the subscripted input and each w represents the share of the subscripted output in aggregate output. A bar over the shares indicates a two-period average.
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The results can also be presented in terms of average labor productivity (ALP), defined as
, the ratio of output Y to hours worked H, and
is the ratio of capital services to hours worked:
where y is labor productivity or output per hour, k n is non-IT capital per hour worked, k IT is IT capital per hour worked, and L Q is labor quality, defined as the ratio of labor input to hours worked.
14 The BLS has produced the official estimates of TFP growth for the U.S. economy since 1983 when the estimated growth in TFP for the business, nonfarm business, and manufacturing sectors was released for the period 1948 -1981 (BLS, 1983 . This major achievement reflected the growing realization among economists and policy makers that many factors determine labor productivity growth and that it is useful to distinguish among them.
15 While the early BLS effort 13 Analysts have often employed the price dual of productivity to generate estimates of TFP growth in the production of IT assets. The intuition is that declines in relative prices for IT goods reflect TFP growth in the IT-producing industries. These relative price declines are weighted by the shares in output of each of the IT investment goods in order to estimate the contribution of IT production to economy-wide TFP growth. The contribution of non-IT is the residual after removing the IT contribution. 14 Our labor input index reflects the changing composition of the work force, giving a larger weight to the hours worked by highly educated, high-wage workers. 15 The BLS TFP program was a response to the Panel to Review Productivity Statistics (1979) , organized by the National Research Council and chaired Albert Rees. The Rees Report became the cornerstone of the new BLS TFP estimates. See Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) for further details on the history of the official estimates.
did not decompose different types of capital such as IT or quantify the impact of labor quality, it nonetheless represented a significant step forward for productivity analysis.
16 Oliner and Sichel (1994) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995) were the first to quantify the impact of IT within a sources of growth framework, although neither of these papers assessed the contribution of TFP growth in the production of IT. Moreover, both studies examined the contribution of only computers to output growth as in Equation (3) and not to labor productivity growth as in Equation (4). The common conclusion was that IT made a relatively small contribution to output growth. Oliner and Sichel (1994) The modest contributions of IT investment were not surprising, given the relative size and importance of IT equipment and software at the time. 18 Oliner and Sichel (1994) , for example, estimated that computer capital accounted for less than one percent of nominal input for 1980-1992. Although they did not measure the ALP contribution specifically, Oliner and Sichel (1994) concluded that "computers probably have not caused much of whatever pickup in aggregate productivity has occurred in recent years (pg. 275)." Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995) reached a similar conclusion and emphasized that rapid price declines induced massive substitution toward computers, but that there was no evidence of "non-pecuniary externalities" or "spill-overs" that would appear as TFP growth.
Subsequently, Gordon (1998) argued that computers had made a small contribution to productivity because "there is something wrong with computers (pg. 5)." In particular, he pointed to limitations of computers in service industries, diminishing returns to computer speed and memory, and the fact that much computer-related activity has zero or negative productivity.
As evidence, he noted that labor productivity slowed for 1993-1997 in the non-manufacturing sector where most of the computers are located. In this view, the primary macroeconomic impact of the computer revolution was on the inflation front as a beneficial supply shock.
Over the following five years these views changed dramatically. BLS (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) , and Oliner and Sichel (2000) reported substantial contributions from IT capital to economic growth. This reflected rapidly accelerating investment in these assets during the late 1990s, their growing relative importance, and the broadening of the IT concept to include software and communications equipment.
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According to recent national income and product accounts (NIPAs) data, for example, the growth of annual investment in computers, software, and telecommunications equipment increased from 13.5 percent for 1987 to 1995 to 22.2% for 1995 to 2000, while the decline of IT prices rose from -3.3% to -7.3%.
BLS, the producers of the official sources of growth and TFP analysis for the U.S.
economy, made its first measurement of the contribution of IT-capital services in its 2000 release (BLS, 2000) . This included a standard growth accounting analysis through 1998 and BLS reported that information processing equipment-computers and related equipment, communications equipment, instruments and photocopying equipment, and software- Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) reported substantially increased contributions of IT during the late 1990s. For the period 1995-1998, they showed that the IT capital services contributed 0.8 percentage points to output growth and about 0.7 to labor productivity growth. In addition, the contribution from TFP growth in IT production was 0.64 percentage points. 20 These components contributed about 55 percent of labor productivity gains for 1995-98. The primary conclusion was that the "pessimism of the famous Solow paradox…has given way to the optimism of the information age (pg. 184)." Oliner and Sichel (2000) reported a contribution to output growth for the period 1996-99 from IT capital, now defined to include computers, software, and telecommunications equipment, of 1.10 percentage points and a 0.96 percentage point contribution to labor productivity growth. They also extended their analysis to quantify the TFP contribution from IT production, which they estimated to be 0.49 percentage points, more than two-fifths of the aggregate TFP growth for the period 1996-1999. Taken together, the use of IT capital and TFP growth in IT production accounted for nearly 60 percent of labor productivity gains, leading Oliner and Sichel (2000) to conclude the new data "place information technology at center stage (pg. 4)" of the U.S. growth resurgence in the late 1990s.
Gordon (2000) We conclude this section with an important point about these studies of the aggregate sources of productivity growth. While IT capital deepening and IT TFP contributions measure the direct contribution from the use and production of IT, respectively, there is a wealth of microeconomic evidence on the complexity of the technology/productivity link. To successfully leverage IT investments, for example, firms must typically make large complementary investments and innovations in areas such as business organization, workplace practices, human capital, and intangible capital (Black and Lynch (2001, 2004) , Brynjolffson and Hitt (2000, 2003) , and Bresnahan et al. (2002) ). It is difficult, however, to incorporate these variables into an aggregate accounting framework, so one should broadly interpret the productive impact of ITuse as inclusive of these complementary factors.
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III. Updated Empirical Estimates
We now present our latest estimates of the sources of U.S. economic growth. We begin with a short description of the data and then present the empirical results.
a) Data
Our output data are based on the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BLS productivity estimates are focused on the private nonfarm business (NFB) sector; here we include the entire private economy, including the services provided by residential housing and consumer durables.
21 Corrado et al. (2006) explicitly incorporate intangible capital into the a neoclassical growth accounting framework. Jorgenson (2001) and Stiroh (2005, 2006) provide estimates for the full economy, including the government sector, using earlier vintages of these data.
Our capital input data are based on the fixed-asset accounts published by BEA. These accounts present business and government investments and consumer durable purchases by detailed asset classes, such as computers, office buildings, and 1-to-4 family homes. We employ a broad measure of capital that includes fixed assets owned by businesses and households, as well as land and inventories. Our prices for capital services use asset-specific values for price changes, service lives, and depreciation rates for each type of asset. -periods 1959-1973, 1973-1995, 1995-2000, and 2000-2005. 23 For comparison purposes, Table 2 widely discussed and has led to considerable debate about the "jobless recovery" and the dating 22 More details on our data are provided by Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005, Chapter 6 This reflects slower IT-price declines and slower IT investment.
We next examine changes in the sources of productivity reported in Table 2 It is also useful to summarize the standard interpretation of the economic forces that drove these developments. The story begins in the IT-producing industries that make IT 25 Note that these estimates differ from the official BLS data reported in Figure 1 because we use annual data, our analysis ends in 2005, and we include consumer durables and residential capital services flows. 26 The contribution of labor quality, or human capital, to growth has slowed substantially over time, as shown in Table 1 . These estimates are similar to DeLong, Goldin and Katz (2003) , which provides calculations back to 1915 using somewhat different methodologies.
equipment to greatly outperform prior generations. 27 As a consequence, the performance of IT has improved even as prices have fallen. This is captured in the high rates of TFP growth in IT production. In response to the spectacular price declines for IT investment, firms have quickly substituted IT assets for other productive inputs. Massive investments in IT equipment and software, about one-third of nonresidential fixed investment in 2000, led to the large contribution of IT-capital deepening to labor productivity growth. While Gordon (2006) points out that this accounts for a smaller share of labor productivity than during the slowdown period of 1973-1995, labor productivity growth was more than twice as fast during the more recent period.
The impact of IT has declined in both a relative and an absolute sense, but we emphasize that IT remains a substantial source of growth in the post-2000 period. IT investment is less than five percent of aggregate output, but Table 1 shows that IT has accounted for one third of the productivity growth since 2000. It is only when comparing the second surge of productivity after 2000 with the initial gains of the late 1990s that the change in the IT contribution is negative.
This reflects a return to more sustainable growth rates after the IT-investment boom of the late 1990s.
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We conclude that IT remains an important source of productivity growth, but that other factors drove the productivity gains after 2000. In other words, IT contributes to productivity, but not all productivity growth is due to IT. Gordon (2006) arrives at a similar conclusion. A closer look at the data reveals that the increase in capital deepening was due to the decline in the growth of hours worked, rather than more rapid capital accumulation. Nonresidential investment Non-IT TFP is measured as the difference between aggregate TFP and the IT component, so it is difficult to provide a simple interpretation of the jump in the non-IT contribution after 2000. One plausible explanation is that the most recent gains reflect cyclical dynamics, so that these gains are unlikely to be sustained, as suggested by Gordon (2003) and Sichel (2003) .
Alternative possibilities are that the gains reflect increased competitive pressures in IT-using industries, technical progress outside IT production, IT as a general purpose technology (GPT) that facilitates subsequent innovation, or investment in unmeasured capital inputs such research and development, organizational change, and other business processes. Basu, et al. (2003) , and
Basu and Fernald (forthcoming) provide evidence for the GPT role of IT by examining the link between TFP growth and lagged growth in IT capital. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006) document the importance of investments in intangible capital, although they conclude that this does not explain the increase in productivity growth rates after 1995.
IV. Projecting Productivity Growth
Future productivity growth is crucial for sustaining the growth of the U.S. economy, but, as indicated earlier, is also hard to project. Projections require assumptions about technical progress and substitution among different types of investment and workers that are difficult to quantify, and a key challenge is to distinguish changes in trend from temporary shocks. We now discuss our methodology, present our empirical results, and compare our estimates to those of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Council of Economic Advisors in the Economic Report of the President (CEA), Board of Trustees of the Social Security Administration (SSA), and other economists' estimates.
a) Methodology and Data
We make two key assumptions that are consistent with the experience of the U.S. over time periods longer than a typical business cycle. First, output and the reproducible capital stock are projected to grow at the same rate. This smoothes fluctuations like the investment boom of the late 1990s and the investment bust during the 2001 recession. Second, hours worked are projected to grow at the same rate as the labor force, which implies that the unemployment rate, labor force participation rates, and hours per worker for each age-sex group remain constant.
These assumptions are appropriate for projections of the potential growth of output, but would obviously be unsuitable for short-run forecasting of output and productivity growth.
We transform our basic growth accounting identity in Equation (4) into a framework for projecting output and productivity growth:
where y is labor productivity, K Q is capital quality, defined as the difference between capital input and capital stock, H is hours, and L Q is labor quality. Each v represents the input share of the subscripted variable and each w represents the output share of the subscripted output. The share of reproducible capital in total capital is denoted u R ; we assume that non-reproducible capital, land and inventories, does not grow.
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30 Additional details about our methodology are presented in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) .
Calibration of Equation (5) requires projections of the output shares of capital and labor, the share of IT output in total output, the share of reproducible-capital stock in total capital, capital-quality growth, labor-quality growth, and TFP growth. Some of these variables can be projected with a relatively high degree of confidence, while others involve considerable uncertainty. We present a single value for the variables we consider relatively easy to projectlabor-quality growth, growth in hours, and the shares of capital, reproducible-capital stock, and IT output. For the variables we consider more difficult to project-TFP growth in IT production, non-IT-TFP growth, and capital-quality growth-we present base-case, pessimistic, and optimistic scenarios in order to emphasize the considerable uncertainty that surrounds this type of exercise.
We first discuss the projections for variables held constant across all three scenarios. For growth in hours worked and labor quality, we construct our own projections of demographic We emphasize the intrinsic uncertainty by recalling the wide variation in non-IT-TFP growth after 1973 shown in It is important to emphasize that projections of capital-quality growth are not independent of growth rates in production of IT and non-IT assets. We have not represented this explicitly because this would require a model with differences in growth rates of TFP in the production of these assets. We turn to the historical record to project all three variables-IT TFP, non-IT TFP,
and capital-quality growth-from similar time periods in order to summarize these effects in a reduced form sense. Our optimistic scenario puts private labor productivity growth at 3.00 percent per year and private output growth at 3.76 percent per year, due to the assumption of continued rapid technical progress. In particular, the two-year product cycle in semiconductors is assumed to persist, which drives rapid TFP growth in the production of IT equipment and software, as well as continued substitution toward IT assets and rapid growth in capital quality. In addition, non-IT-TFP growth continues its rapid growth after 1995. Productivity growth is more rapid than . 33 Given the uncertainties we have emphasized, it is not surprising that there is considerable divergence among these projections and that the estimates are frequently, and often substantially, revised.
b) Productivity Projections
To provide an appropriate context for our results, we compare our estimates with several recent projections by government agencies, academic economists, and private forecasters. Table   4 summarizes the productivity, hours, and output projections from a variety of sources. The top panel reports estimates for the private economy, typically the nonfarm business sector, while the bottom panel reports estimates for the full economy. While not all analysts report all estimates, the time periods are not all the same, the data vintages differ, and this is not an exhaustive list, these comparisons provide a useful perspective on the range of plausible forecasts.
Beginning with the private economy, the projections of potential NFB productivity growth average 2.4 percent for the next decade. This is somewhat below the 2.7 percent growth observed since 1995. When combined with projected growth of hours worked of 0.8 percent, the consensus estimate is for NFB output growth is about 3.2 percent. Note that the more recent estimates tend to be lower, e.g., Survey of Professional Forecasters (2007), CBO (2007), Gordon (2006) , and JPMorgan (2006), which reflects the relatively slow productivity growth in recent years that has been pushing trend estimates down.
There is considerable variation in output estimates for the full economy, ranging from 2.5 percent by Gordon (2006) (2007), as well as our own estimate of 0.8 percent, which fixes participation rates for each demographic group. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the underlying sources of these differences, but it is important to recognize that the resolution of this issue will have substantial consequences for the potential growth of output and productivity.
V. Conclusions
The key challenges to understanding productivity growth on a real-time basis include large and frequent data revisions and unanticipated shocks that impact both trend and cyclical components. This paper documents how perceptions of U.S. productivity growth and its sources have evolved over time as the economy fluctuated and the historical record was revised. We show how IT emerged as the driving force behind the acceleration of labor productivity growth that began in the mid-1990s, while the strong performance of productivity growth since 2000 reflects non-IT-capital deepening and TFP growth, and thus remains to be explained in a deeper sense. (2006) concluded that the "recent experience does not appear to require a significant rethinking of longterm productivity trends" and notes that the consensus projection remains just below 2.5 percent, as in Table 4 . This is above the historical average, but falls short of the pace seen in the 2000s.
The relative stability in the productivity outlooks implies that a substantial portion of the post-2000 productivity gains can be attributed to transitory factors. Nonetheless, there is cautious optimism that the continuation of factors that drove the U.S. productivity resurgence for the entire post-1995 period will persist. These include specific factors such as an expectation that information technology will continue to impact the U.S. economy, as well as broader factors such as flexible labor markets, competitive product markets with relatively low barriers to entry, and deep, sophisticated, capital markets, all of which allow the U.S. economy to innovate and benefit from emerging technologies. 34 As a consequence, there is little evidence to suggest that the technology-led productivity resurgence is over or that the U.S. economy will revert to the slower pace of productivity growth of the 1970s and 1980s.
34 Baily (2002) discusses the broader changes to the U.S. economy that facilitated productivity growth in the 1990s and the OECD (2006) provides a discussion of specific policy reforms in OECD countries designed to spur productivity growth. 
